April, X928.

RECENT CASES
ADMIRALTY-JURISDICTION

OF STATE

COURT-WORXMEN'S

COMPENSATION

AcTs-The plaintiff, in the employ of a contractor who was engaged in repairing a vessel lying in the Delaware River, was injured by a fellow-employee,
while in the course of his employment, in the engine room of the vessel. He
claimed under the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act' and received
an award. The award was contested by the insurance carrier of the plaintiff's
employer on the ground that the state compensation board had no jurisdiction,
since the claim is cognizable only in admiralty. Held, that the state compensation board had jurisdiction. Span v. Accident and Guarantee Corporation,
Pa. Superior Court, decided March 2, 1928.
Since the decision in the Jensen case' state courts have experienced no
little difficulty in determining when to apply their local workmen's compensation statutes and when to withhold that application. The United States Supreme Court has rebuked them for their timidity as well as for their zeal in
the enforcement of state acts.3 In general the Jensen case announced that no
state legislation is valid which works material prejudice to the characteristic
features of the general maritime law or interferes with the proper harmony and
uniformity of the law in its international and interstate relations. In determining jurisdiction it is necessary to consider the locality upon which the injury
occurred; the relationship of the parties; the nature of the employment,'
whether maritime or non-maritime; and the nature of the statute, whether
compulsory or elective.' In the principal case the court treats the problem as
one in tort. It finds that the contract of employment and the locality of the
injury are both maritime, but states, "It is now definitely settled that for some
maritime torts, state compensation laws may be enforced without encroaching
'Act of 1915, P. L. 736, PA. STAT. (West, 1920) §21916 et seq. The
Pennsylvania law is of the elective type and provides that the employer's insurance carrier shall be responsible to the injured employee.
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205 (917).
'In the following cases the state court was reversed for applying state
act: Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, supra note 2; Clyde Steamship Co. v.
Walker, 244 U. S.255 (1917); Robins Dry Dock Co. v. Dahl, 266 U. S. 449
(where local statutory rule of evidence was applied). Reversed for
(1925)
;
failure to apply state act: Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U. S. 233 (92)
State Industrial Commission v. Nordenholt, 259 U. S. 263 (1922); State Industrial Board v. Terry & Tench Co., 273 U. S.639 (1926), reversing 240 N. Y.
292.

'For classification along this line see (1927) 75 U. OF PA. L. REv. 469.
'The United States Supreme Court has indicated by its latest pronouncement that if the locality of the injury is not maritime, no further inquiry is
necessary to determine that the state compensation act shall apply. Smith &
Son v. Taylor. U. S. Sup. Ct., decided Feb. 20, 1928 (Where stevedore, standing on the dock, was knocked into the river by cargo being lowered over the
side of the vessel. For his death by drowning his widow was awarded compensation under the local compensation act The award was upheld by the
United States Supreme Court).
(743)
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on the admiralty; the test is: will such enforcement 'materially affect any rule
of the sea whose uniformity is essential?'" The feature of the case which
removes it from conflict with any rule of admiralty jurisdiction is that the suit
is not in tort, but is one upon the contract of insurance voluntarily entered into
by the defendant under which it agreed to be liable to the plaintiff. To such a
situation the so-called rule of the Jensen case has no proper application. A
different holding would enable insurance companies to collect the premiums,
but when injuries occur to avoid any payments under their policies.

BANxRUPTcY-A

UDIcATION

OF

PARTNERSHIP-EFFECT

ON

STATUTORY

LIENS AGAINST THE SEPARATE PROPERTY OF THE PARTNxRs-Plaintiff secured

judgments against a partnership, and also against the two individual partners.
These judgments, by statutory provision,1 became a lien upon the real estate
belonging to the judgment debtors. One month later, a petition in bankruptcy
was filed against the partnership and it was adjudged a bankrupt. After a
period of over eight months had elapsed, each of the individual partners filed
voluntary petitions in bankruptcy. It was admitted that the plaintiff had lost
the lien upon the real estate of the partnership, because the lien had been obtained less than four months prior to the petition against the partnership? The
trustee in bankruptcy claimed that the lien upon the property of the individual
partners had also been lost, and the Circuit Court of Appeals sustained his
contention on the theory that the adjudication of the partnership operated also
as an adjudication of the individual partners
Held, on appeal, that the lien
upon the separate property of the partners was not lost, as the adjudication of
the partnership was not an adjudication of the partners. Liberty National
Bank v. Bear, U. S. Sup. Ct., decided Feb. 20, 1928.
The sections of the Bankruptcy Act of x898 which made it possible to
adjudge a partnership a bankrupt' have given rise to several problems which
have resulted in conflicting decisions. In deciding these cases, the courts have
had to determine the extent to which a partnership is a distinct legal entity, for
bankruptcy purposes. The obvious and accepted interpretation is that a partnership can be adjudicated a bankrupt although no petitions are filed against
§§647o, 6471.
'Bankruptcy Act of i898, § I(I), 30 STAT. 544 (1898), U. S. C. TIT.
XI, § I(I) : "'A person against whom a petition has been filed' shall include a
person who has filed a voluntary petition." § 67f, 30 STAT. 565 (1898), U. S.
'VA.CODE ANN. (I919)

C. TIT. XI, § 107:

"That all

. . . liens, obtained through legal pro-

ceedings against a person who is insolvent, at any time within four months prior

to the filing of a petition in bankruptcy against him, shall be deemed null and

void incase he is adjudged a bankrupt, and the property affected by the .
lien shall be deemed wholly discharged and released from the same, and shall

pass to the trustee as a part of the estate of the bankrupt."
'For the history of the principal case in the Circuit Court of Appeals, see
285 Fed. 703 (C. C. A. 4th, 1922) and 18 F.(2d) 281 (C. C. A. 4th, 1927).
'Sec. I(I9), 30 STAT. 544 (1898), U. S. C. TIT. XI, §1(19): "'Persons' shall include . . . partnerships . . .": §5(a), 30 STAT. 547
(1898), U. S. C. A. TIT. XI, § 23(a) : "A partnership, during the continuation
of the partnership business, or after its dissolution and before the final settlement thereof, may be adjudged a bankrupt."

RECENT CASES
the partners as individuals.! But if the act of bankruptcy involves the insolvency of the partnership, it must be shown that the partners are also insolvent.'
If one or more of the partners were in a position to satisfy the debts of the
partnership, the latter would not be insolvent. A further restriction on the
entity theory is seen in the rule that a partner who has not been adjudged a
bankrupt may be compelled to turn over his personal assets to the partnership's
trustee in bankruptcy.7 Because he is liable at common law for the debts of the
partnership, his assets are assets of the partnership. On the other hand, when
the problem concerns the discharge of the partnership the entity theory seems
to be carried out more broadly. For when the partnership alone was adjudged
a bankrupt, it has been held that the discharge did not bar any debts but those
of the partnership 8 and the individual member would still be liable. If the discharge does not affect the partners individually, the adjudication should not be
given greater effect. It would, therefore, logically follow that the adjudication
of the firm does not, of itself, operate as an adjudication of the partners.

BANXRUPTCY-JURISDICTION OF THE BANKRUPTCY COURT AFTER CoNFmm-

A CoMPosiboN-A corporation, adjudicated bankrupt, made a composition agreement with its creditors, which was subsequently confirmed. The
petitioner, a creditor scheduled therein, sought to set aside the confirmation for
fraud because his share of the composition consideration had not been deposited. From an order setting it aside, the bankrupt appeals. The Circuit Court
found there was no fraud. Held, that, even in the absence of fraud, the court
could compel the bankrupt to deposit the notes due the creditor. In re Isidor
Klein, Inc., 22 F.(2d) 9o6 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927).
The immediate question of the court's power over the bankrupt after confirming the composition under the Bankruptcy Act' has previously not been
raised in this form. Confirmation discharges the bankrupt of all claims of
scheduled creditors, provable in bankruptcy! Clearly, where no jurisdiction of
ING

'Meek v.Centre County Banking Co., 268 U. S. 426, 431 (1925); Carter
v. Whisler, 275 Fed. 743, 746 (C. C. A. 8th, Ig2i); In re Samuels, 215 Fed.
845, 847 (C. C. A. 2d, 1914); In re Meyer, 98 Fed. 976, 979 (C. C. A. 2d,
1899) ; (1913) 6I U. OF PA. L. REV. 274.
' A partnership is not insolvent unless the assets of the partnership plus
the assets of the members (above the individual debts of the members) are insufficient to satisfy the debts of the partnership. In re Fuller, 9 F.(2d) 553
(C. C. A. 2d, 1925) ; Baker v. Bates-Street Shirt Co., 6 F.(2d) 854 (C.C. A.
1st, 1925); Francis v. McNeal, 186 Fed. 481, 484 (C C. A. 3d, x911).
' The controversy on this point was settled by Francis v. McNeal, 228 U. S.
695 (1913).
"Horner v. Hanner, 249 Fed. 134 (C. C. A. 4th, 1918) ; In re Hale, io7 Fed.
432 (E. D. N. C. i9oi) ; (1924) 37 HAv. L. REv. 614.

'Sec.

of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 30 STAT. 549 (1898), U. S. C.
"Upon confirmation . . . the consideration shall be distributed as the judge shall direct, and the case dismissed."
2
In re Frischknecht, 223 Fed. 417, 34 Am. B. R. 53o (C. C. A. 2d,
1915) ; In re Mirkus, 289 Fed. 732, I Am.B. R. (N. 's.) 97 (C. C. A. 2d,
12(e)

(1925) Trr. XI, § 3o(e) provides:
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any sort has been obtained over the funds, as by a submission of the schedule,
the court cannot compel the bankrupt to act upon them! This court recognized general principles in another recent case, by refusing to increase the
deposit for a scheduled creditor, after the amount at which his claim was
listed, was confirmed.' But where an improper schedule, failing to state a specific amount as due a creditor, was confirmed, and the deposit proved less than
the actual amount due, the bankrupt was compelled to deposit the deficiency.'
Since the court has no proper jurisdiction to confirm a composition until the
deposit is made,' it would seem that without a deposit, there could be no valid
discharge. The composition is in the nature of a contract of accord and satisfaction. In theory the offer is made to all the creditors.' The bankrupt should,
therefore, deposit enough to provide for all; and if the court confirms the composition, it should be able to order an addition for creditors not yet included.
This would be, in reality, a mere correction of irregular procedure, such as is
within the power of courts in general. Where there has been no deposit, the
failure, though non-fraudulent, is a refusal to obey a court order, which would,
under the Bankruptcy Act," prevent a discharge that places the bankrupt beyond
the court's jurisdiction. "Dismissal," under the Act, does not absolutely deprive
the court of further administrative powers,' and it may well be that there is
no dismissal until after the consideration has been distributed.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DuE PROCESS-RESTRAINING MUNICIPALITY FROM
agreement between the petitioner, a railroad, and the town of Morristown, New Jersey,
provided, inter alia, that the town should exercise all necessary police powers
in and upon the station and station grounds of the petitioner for the purpose
REGULATING TRAFFIC ON A RAILROAD STATION DRIVEWAY-An

1923). Courts are not in agreement as to whether a scheduled creditor has
more than a year after the adjudication of bankruptcy in which to prove his
claim. See In re Fox, 6 Am. B. R. 525 (D. C. Ohio, i9oI); In re Aarons,
243 Fed. 634, 40 Am. B. R. 229 (D. C. N. J. 1917) ; In re Watman, 291 Fed.
886, 1 Am. B. R. (N. S.) 331 (S. D. N. Y. 1923).
'In re Kalnitsky Bros., 285 Fed. 649, 49 Am. B. R. 697 (S. D. N. Y.
1922) ; In re Frischknecht, supra note 2.
'In re Laubheim Bros., 22 Fed. (2d) 910 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927).
"In re Watman, op. cit. supra note 2.
$In re Frear, 12o Fed. 798, io Am. B. R. igg (N. D. N. Y. 1903); In re
Harris, 117 Fed. 575, 9 Am. B. R. 20 (D. C. Tenn. igo2); In re Passow, 3oo
Fed. 544, 4 Am. B. R. (N. s.) 1067 (C. C. A. 6th, 1924). See also (I9z4) i9
Im- L. REv. 347 discussing Nassau Smelting Works v. Brightwood Bronze
Co., 265 U. S. 269 (1924).
'In re Atlantic Construction Co., 228 Fed. 571, 35 Am. B. R. 838, (D. C.
N. Y. i9i5).
'Sec. 12(b) of the Bankruptcy Act of i898, 3o STAT. 549 (1898), U. S.
C. (1925) TIT. XI, §30(b) provides: "The judge shall confirm a composition if satisfied . . . the bankrupt has not been guilty of any acts . . .

which would be a bar to his discharge."
'U. S. v. Sondheim, i88 Fed. 378, 33 Am. B. R. 217 (S. DY. Mass. igio);
In re Fox, supra note 2.
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of regulating traffic. 1 It was agreed that the petitioner's driveway was not to
be considered dedicated as a public highway. In 1922 the petitioner granted to
W the exclusive right to park his vehicles on the driveway and solicit business
as a cabman in the station and on its grounds. Thereupon the town adopted an
ordinance prohibiting the parking of automobiles in the driveway, and this was
upheld by the New Jersey courts.! Subsequently, in 1924, the ordinance in
question was passed, establishing a public hackstand on the driveway.'- In a
suit by the petitioner against the town and the taxicab owners who parked their
cars on the allotted .space and solicited patronage, the District Court for New
Jersey held that the ordinance was repugnant to the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment; restrained the individual defendants from parking
vehicles or soliciting, patronage on the station grounds; and forever restrained
the town from interfering with or hindering the railroad in the "occupation,
use or control of its said station grounds, or in regulating the place, manner or
time in which public or private vehicles going to and from said station grounds
shall enter, stand or wait thereon or depart from the same." The Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed the decree and directed the District Court to dismiss the
case. The Supreme Court of the United States granted a writ of certiorari.
Held, that the decree of the District Court is affirmed. The Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R. R. v. Morristown, U. S. Sup. Ct., decided Feb. 20, 1928.
There is no question under modern conditions that a common carrier owes
a duty to its patrons to provide adequate opportunities of ingress to and egress
from its stations,' but courts do not agree as to its extent. The federal courts
The agreement provided that "said driveway shall be kept open at all
times for passengers, pedestrians . . . and vehicular traffic to and from
the station grounds . . . but this contract shall not be construed as a
dedication of said driveway as a public highway. . . . the Town may and

shall exercise all necessary police powers in and upon the station, station
grounds, approaches and driveways, for the purpose of regulating foot and
vehicular traffic at said station, and for the enforcement of the rules and regulations of the Railroad Companies in respect thereto."
'In a suit brought by W against the town the State Supreme Court held
this ordinance to be a valid regulation of traffic under general power of the
town and under the agreement. Welsh v. Morristown, 98 N. J. L. 630, 121
Atl. 697 (1923), affd. sub nomine Welsh v. Potts, 99 N. J. L. 528, 124 At.
926 (1924).

'The ordinance declared a space including that set aside by the petitioner
for the use of W's vehicles to be "an additional public hackstand' and prohibited
the parking of vehicles in other parts of the driveway.
'Justice Butler delivered the opinion of the court. Justice Brandeis wrote
a separate opinion, Justice Holmes concurring, in which they agreed that the
decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals, directing a dismissal of the railroad's
bill, should be reversed, but felt that the decree of the District Court was too
broad and required serious modification.
"'In these days, the ability of the traveller to obtain conveniently upon
reaching the street door of the station, a taxicab to convey him and his handbaggage to his ultimate destination, is an essential of adequate rail transportation. The duties of a rail carrier are not necessarily limited to transporting
freight and passengers to and from its stations. It must, in connection with its
stations, provide adequately for ingress and for egress. And if it does not
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hold that the railroad may provide adequate accommodations by allowing one
taxicab company to furnish the service, and may therefore give an exclusive
privilege to enter the station and depot grounds to solicit patronage.' The
other line of authority denies the right of the railroad to make such an exclusive contract on the ground that the railroad passengers are entitled to the
benefits of competition.' Under either view, however, it would seem that the
ordinance in question contravenes the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, for it attempts (without compensation) to use the petitioner's
land as a public hackstand.' This would permit its use by taxicabs which did
not even serve railroad passengers, contrary, both to the duties of the petitioner
as a public servant, and to the stipulation in the agreement that the driveway was not dedicated as a public street. But it appears that the decree
of the District Court, which was affirmed by the Supreme Court, goes too
far in upholding the rights of the railroad. It is, in the first place, inconsistent with the agreement since its broad language would restrain the town
from making reasonable traffic regulations for the driveway in the exercise of
its police powers. Furthermore, should the railroad fail to perform its duty
to its patrons in providing a suitable way for them to reach and leave the
station, the town should be permitted to adopt such provisions as would safeguard their comfort and convenience.'
itself provide the facilities essential for the convenient removal of freight and
passengers from the station, it may be required to let others provide them."
Justice Brandeis in the principal case.
"Donovan v. Pennsylvania Co., 199 U. S. 279 (i9o5); New York, New
Haven & Hartford R. R. v. Scovill, 7I Conn. 136, 41 Atl. 246 (1898). For
a discussion of this subject see

I

WYMAN,

PuBLc SERVICE CORPORATIONS

(I9II) 398. Those favoring the federal view argue that there is a practical inconvenience in allowing more than a single concern to provide this service
since competition results in confusion, noisy solicitations, annoyance and inconvenience to the passengers.
State v. Reed, 76 Miss. 211, 24 So. 308 (1898); Montana Union Ry. v.
Langlois, 9 Mont. 419, 24 Pac. 209 (1890).
'See Great Northern Ry. v. Minnesota, 238 U. S. 340 (I915); Great
Northern Ry. v. Cahill, 253 U. S. 71 (920).

' "The record shows that the service which W can furnish is inadequate,
that to grant him sufficient licenses to enable him to furnish such service
would impair taxi service throughout the town, and that a taxi-stand located
elsewhere than on the driveway does not satisfy the needs of travellers leaving
the station. If, under these circumstances, the town should pass an ordinance
establishing, on the driveway, a taxi-stand available only to incoming passengers, I see no reason why, under the contract between it and the railroad
or under the general laws of New Jersey, it may not do so." Justice Brandeis
in the princpial case.
Justice Harlan, in Donovan v. Pennsylvania Co., supra note 6 at 295 said:
"The record does not show that the arrangement referred to (exclusive contract with one taxicab company) was inadequate for the accommodation of
passengers. But if inadequate, or if the (taxicab company) was allowed to
charge exorbitant prices, it was for passengers to complain of neglect of duty
by the railroad company and for the constituted authorities to take steps to
compel the company to perform its public functions with due regard to the
rights of passengers."

RECENT CASES
CONTRACTS - CHARITABLE SUBSCRIPTIONS - CONSIDERATION-The defendant's testatrix, "in consideration of her interest in Christian education" and
of the subscriptions of others, pledged $5ooo to the plaintiff college, to be paid
thirty days after her death. She added to the printed pledge form: "In loving
memory this gift shall be known as the . . . Johnson [testatrix's name]
memorial fund, the proceeds of which shall be used to educate students preparing for the ministry . . ." and "this pledge shall be valid only on condition that the provisions of my will . . . shall be first met." The testatrix
paid $iooo on account, which the college set aside as a special fund; and later
she gave notice that she repudiated the promise. Thirty days after her death the
college sued for the balance of the pledge. Held, (two judges dissenting) that
Allegheny College v. Arational Chautauqua County
the college recover.
Bank, 246 N. Y. 369, i59 N. E. 175 (1927).
Reviewing tendencies away from the requirement of consideration' and
'
toward "promissory estoppel," the majority of the court, in an opinion by
to hold the subscription binding even withwillingness
expresses
a
Cardozo, J.,
out strict common law consideration. But for the actual decision it finds valid
common law consideration for the pledge in an implied promise by the college to take proper steps toward establishing the fund in the name of the subscriber and to use her name in announcements relating to it. If such a promise
may be implied, it is clearly valid consideration in the strictest sense; and
there is -no "stretching"' of classic rules of consideration in favor of charitable institutions. But it is submitted that in order to imply such a promise
the court must first assume what it attempts to prove, i. e., the existence in
both parties of an intention to contract and of an intention that the undoubted
duty to use the subscriber's name should be a legal and not a mere moral
duty, and should be the price of the promise (consideration) instead of a mere
condition of a gift.' If the latter view is taken, as by the dissenting judges,

'See Notes, 38 A. L. R. at 873 (1925) ; 48 L. R. A. (N. s.) 784 (914).
The Uniformn Written Obligations Act (dispensing with need for consideration), passed May 13, 1927 by the Pennsylvania Legislature (1927, P. L. 985),
and noted in (1928) 76 U. OF PA. L. REv. 58o, has not been adopted in New
York.
See I WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (i92o) § i39.
I ibid. §i16.
"In I WILI.SnN, op. cit. supra § 112, it is said: "It is often difficult to
determine whether words of condition in a promise indicate a request for consideration or state a mere condition in a gratuitous promise. An aid, though
not a conclusive test in determining which construction of the promise is
more reasonable is an inquiry whether the happening of the condition will
be a benefit to the promisor." While it is true that having her name attached
to the fund would be a benefit to the subscriber, this is not conclusive of
her intention to contract; and the expressions "pledge," "gift," and "in
loving memory," and the clause providing that the pledge should be valid
only if the provisions of the subscriber's will be first met seem to point the
other way. (As to the weight to be given the word "gift," see Jamieson
On the other hand, the college
v. Renwick, 17 Vict. L. Rep. 124 [i8q1].)
being in Pennsylvania, and the pledge form containing the phrase "in consideration of the subscriptions of others," which is regarded in Pennsylvania
as sufficient to make a charitable subscription a binding contract (Edinboro
Academy v. Robinson, 37 Pa. 21o [i86o]), it would be- entirely reasonable
to find that the college did intend to contract. "
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a promise on the part of the college can no more be implied, nor a bilateral
contract found, than in cases of implication of a promise to apply the subscription to purposes of the institution,' which cases are dearly decided on public
policy and not on classic rules of consideration" The subscription could not,
of course, have been an offer of a unilateral contract accepted by the college's
naming the fund,' because the college did not name the fund before the subscriber's revocation or death. And this is true even under the very "modern" view of the American Law Institute Restatement,' by which, though an
offeror of a unilateral contract may be bound by part performance by the
offeree, he cannot be bound by mere preparations, even though they be essential to performance or acceptance of the offer. Hence, it seems that the
decision must actually be said to rest not on a strict common law consideration, but on a feeling, increasingly common among American courts,' that
refusal to pay subscriptions to charitable organizations is a "breach of faith
toward the public:"' and that such subscriptions should be enforced. In
pursuance of this attitude courts have often found consideration in the subscriptions of others; but New York has never approved this theory 1 It
is possible that consideration might be found in the "accomplishment of the
object" for which the subscription was given," i. e., in the college's setting
aside the first payment and creating an endowment fund. But whether these
acts alone, without actual outlay or forbearance to collect from other sources,
are substantial enough to raise a promissory estoppel (another ground of
5Kentucky Female Orphan School v. Fleming, 1O Bush. 234 (Ky. 1874);
Helfenstein's Estate, 77 Pa. 328 (1875).
o I WILUSTON, CONTRACTS (i920) § 116. In such cases the element of
benefit to the promisor, discussed supra note 4, and present in the instant case,
is lacking.
' It was apparently not argued that establishing the fund, as opposed to
naming it, should be considered as an acceptance of an offer of a unilat, ral
contract. If such a view were adopted there might have been room for argument that there had been an acceptance.
'CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT No. I, §45; CONTRACTS TREATISE No. I (a),
§ 68, rL 73, citing Stensgaard v. Smith, 43 Minn. 11, 44 N. W. 669 (I89O), in
which the defendant promised the plaintiff an exclusive agency for three
months, with a commission for making a sale of certain property. The plaintiff endeavored to make the sale and published advertisements and solicited
purchasers. Before the expiration of the three months the defendant sold the
property himself. The plaintiff was held to have no cause of action.
'See Note, 38 A. L. R. 868 (1925). But in England subscriptions to
charity are apparently still held unenforceable for want of consideration.
In re Hudson, 54 L. J. Ch. (N. s.) 811 (1885); Note, 38 A. L. R. at 886
(1925). But see Sargent v. Nicholson, 25 D. L. R. 638 (1915).
1Barnes
v. Perine, 12 N. Y. 18 (1854).
I WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920)
§ 116. See Stewart v. Hamilton College, I N. Y. 581 (1848) ; Presbyterian Church v. Cooper, 112 N. Y. 517, 20
N. E. 352 (1889) ; Twenty-third Street Church v. Cornell, 117 N. Y. 6oi, 23
N. E. 177 (1890). Is it possible that the court might have held the contract
to have been made in Pennsylvania, and so, under Pennsylvania law, valid as
having consideration in the subscriptions of others? The facts bearing on
the question of where the contract was made are not fully stated in the case.
'See McOuley v. Billenger, 20 Johns 89 (N. Y. 1822); Irwin v. Lombard University, 56 Ohio St. 9, 46 N. E. 63 (897).
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enforcing charitable subscriptions) is an interesting question expressly left undecided by the instant case, and one on which other cases seem to throw little
light.
CORPORATIONS-POWER OF A CORPORATION TO Buy ITS OwN STOC: FROM
stockholders of a corporation file a bill
to set aside a trust deed executed by the corporation to secure payment for
dissatisfied stockholder's stock to be purchased by the corporation at par. At
the time the trust deed was executed the corporation was 4 going concern, and
there was no intention to dissolve or wind up its affairs. Four months later
the corporation's property was sold, and the proceeds, if distributed, would
pay the plaintiffs less than par for their stock. Held, that the execution of the
trust deed was intravires. Rasmussen v. Roberge, 216 N. W. 481 (Wis. 1927).
It is now generally held that a corporation has the power, when not expressly prohibited by statute,1 to purchase its own stock provided it makes the
payment from surplus and without prejudice to the rights of creditors or other
stockholders.? In most jurisdictions, the surplus for this purpose is the assets
less the capital stock and liabilities," but in Wisconsin a corporation may buy
its own stock so long as its assets are in substantial excess of its liabilities,
and for such purposes its capital stock is not to be considered as a liability.4
The novelty of the instant decision rests in the fact that the reason for purchasing the stock was to eliminate internal discord and dissatisfaction of complaining stockholders. Since the elimination of such dissension is a legitimate
means of furthering the corporate objects, purchase for this purpose seems
justified. The seeming preference of the stockholders who received par for
their stock is not the result of an ultra,vires contract, but rather the result
of a consistent application of the exceptional Wisconsin rule that a corporation has power to buy its own stock, even though such stock is not considered
in determining the corporation's surplus.
DISSATISFIED STOcKHOLDERS-Certain

CRIMINAL

testifying as a
ments. On the
them. He was
conviction was
before the final

LAW-PERURY-CORRECTION

OF

FALSE

TESTiMoNY-While

witness at a previous trial, the defendant made false statefollowing day, he voluntarily resumed the stand and corrected
indicted for perjury and convicted. Held, on appeal, that the
error, as the defendant had corrected his original testimony
submission of the case. Brannen v. State, 114 So. 429 (Fla.

1927).

'BALLENTINE, PRIVATE CORPORATbONS (1927) 29.
'Bank v. Peoria Watch Co., 191 Ill. 128, 6o N. E. 859 (Igoi); Tapper
v. Boston Chamber of Commerce, 235 Mass. 209, 126 N. E. 464 (1920);
For other jurisdictions
Beltz v. Garrison, 254 Pa. 145, 98 Atl. 956 (i916).
see 2 COOK, CoR'oRATIONS (8th ed. 1923) io29, n. I.
3
Du Pont v. Du Pont, 242 Fed. 98 (D. C. Del. 1917); Tiger v. Rogers
Cotton Cleaner Co., 96 Ark. I, 130 S. W. 585 (igIo); In re International
Radiator Co., 28 Del. 261, 92 Atl. 255 (914).
'Marvin v. Anderson, III Wis. 387, 87 N. W. 26 (igoi).
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The offer of false testimony by a witness with knowledge of its falsity
constitutes perjury, and a subsequent contradiction and correction of such
testimony is ordinarily no defense.' That the correction was made before the
submission of the case should make no difference? The contrary doctrine
originated by way of dictum in the New York case of People v. Gillette, and
can be supported only on grounds of public policy, as it "encourages the correction of erroneous and even intentionally false statements on the part of a
witness."' Since, however, the original misstatements will obviously also be
encouraged if the witness knows he can secure immunity by subsequent correction, it seems that this is an unwarranted modification of the universal rule
that atonement or restitution is no defense to a criminal charge.! If any such
doctrine is recognized, it should be strictly confined to situations, like the
Gillette case, where the witness voluntarily and immediately corrects himself.
If it is extended, as the New York courts have done, to cases where the witness is compelled to admit the truth on cross-examination," or where he corrects his false testimony with the obvious intent of providing himself with a
defense in case of a prosecution for perjury,' the doctrine defeats its own
purpose. Up to the present, it is true, it has been confined to situations where
the contradictory statements are part and parcel of one oral examination-! It
is reasoned that such an examination is to be taken as a single statement of
certain facts, and that perjury is not committed unless the whole of it conveys
a false impression, regardless of the truth of its parts. The principal case, by
applying the doctrine where the correction was made on a subsequent examination, evades even this semblance of logic retained by the New York decisions.
ESTATEs-RELEASE OF A RIGHT OF ENTRY FOR CoNDION BROKEN-In
1862 property was conveyed to the plaintiff. In the deed of conveyance there
was a condition that the premises should be used only for religious purposes
and in case of breach that the grantor or his heirs should have the right to reenter. In 1893, twenty-nine years after the grantor's death, the plaintiff
secured a quitclaim deed from all the living heirs. The plaintiffs now propose
to use the building for other than religious purposes and the later heirs, not

. In fact, a contradictory statement by the witness may be used as evidence that the crime was committed. Brooks v. State, 91 Ark. 505, 12, S. W.
740 (I9o9) ; Hereford v. People, 197 Ill. 222, 64 N. E. 312 (1902) ; People
v. Burden, 9 Barb. 467 (N. Y. 1850). See Comment (1922) 21 MICH. L.
REv. 218.
'Martin v. Miller, 4 Mo. 47 (835).
' 126 App. Div. 665, nii N. Y. Supp. 133 (9o8).
' People v. Brill, ioo Misc. 92, io2, i65 N. Y. Supp. 65, 71 (1917); 2
BISHOP, CRIMINAL LAW (9th ed. 1923) § xo44a.
'I

BisHop, op. cit. supra note 4, §§ 2O8a,

732.

'People v. Glass, 191 App. Div. 483, 18i N. Y. Supp. 547 (1920).
"Matter of Popper, 193 App. Div. 5o5, 184 N. Y. Supp. 406 (1920).
'In People v. Markan, 123 Misc. 689, 2o6 N . Y. Supp. 197 (924), the
court indicated the rule would not apply where the correction was made several
months later, though before the conclusion of the trial.
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in existence when the release was made, claim the right to re-enter. The
plaintiffs petition for a judgment declaratory of their rights. Held, that the
quitclaim deed was a valid release and defendants have no interest. Trustees
of the Calvary Presbyterian Church v. Putnam, 221 App. Div. 5o2 (N. Y.
1927).

A conveyance of property subject to a condition subsequent creates in the
grantor a contingent right of re-entry.1 This right cannot be sold or assigned
to a stranger,' although it may be released to the grantee or to subsequent purchasers. If no release is made the grantor's right passes to his heirs.' The
defendants in the present action denied the validity of the release on the
ground that the releasors derived their rights from the deed which only gave
them the right of re-entry for a breach occurring during their lifetime. Thus
it would seem that their release should not be effective for a longer period.
However, if the deed made no mention of the heirs they would succeed to the
grantor's right to release as an incident of their heirship." It .isunlikely
that in making the express reservation in the deed the grantor intended to create an interest in his heirs different than that accorded them by operation of
law. To allow a distinction would restrain the alienation of the estate and
thereby "directly contravene the settled policy of the law which aims to secure
free disposition of real property."' Without such a distinction, it follows
that the release made to plaintiff in 1893 was a valid disposition of a right
fully possessed by the heirs in existence, and the defendants are in the same
position as if the grantor himself made the release.'

L

NS-VALIDTY OF A REPAIRMAN'S LIEN AGAINST A CONDITIONAL VEN-

noR-The plaintiff delivered three taxicabs to B under hire-purchase agreements
by the terms of which B agreed to keep them in repair and not to subject them
to liens for such repairs. B delivered the cabs to the defendant to have them
repaired. The defendant knew, at that time, that B held them under hire-.
purchase agreements, but was ignorant of the terms thereof. While the cabs
were in the defendant's possession, B defaulted in his payments to the plaintiff.
Thereupon the plaintiff terminated its agreement with B and demanded the
cabs from the defendant. The latter claimed a common law lien for repairs
and refused to surrender them. The plaintiff brought an action of detinue.
'Although the court uses the term possibility of reverter, the term used
in the comment seems more accurate. See I TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (1st
ed. 1903) § I6.
'CHALLIS, REAL PROPERTY' (3d ed. 1911) 153.
'2 WASHBURN, REAL PROPERTY (4th ed. 1887) C. 14, § 26; IO R. C. L. 653
and cases cited.
'Glore v. Scroggins, 124 Ga. 922, 53 S. E. 69o (19o6) ; Hart v. Lake, 273
Ill. 6q, 112 N. E. 286 (I916) ; Pond v. Douglass, io6 Me. 85, 75 At. 320 (I1).
'Glore v. Scroggins, Hart v. Lake, Pond v. Douglass, all supra note 4.
See also Upington v. Corrigan, 15 N. Y. 143, 45 N. E. 359 (1896), where the
court said, "She had an election to enter for condition broken and she could
release her right to do so. To those rights her heirs, after her death, succeeded."
'Proprietors of the Church v. Grant, 3 Gray 142 (Mass. 1855).
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Held, that the defendant had a lien valid against the plaintiff. Albernarle Supply Co. v. Hind & Co. [1928] i K. B. 307.

The general rule is that a common law repairman's lien is not valid
against the owner of the chattel unless acquired by his order, consent, or
authority.1 Under this rule it is held in England,2 and in some American
jurisdictions, that delivery of a motor vehicle to a conditional vendee' by a
conditional vendor, under the former's agreement to keep it in repair, impliedly
authorizes him to subject it to liens valid against the vendor 5 But it seems
that the principal case is not within this rule, for here the plaintiff expressly
denied the conditional vendee any authority to subject the vehicle to lien. Recognizing this, the court seems to ground the decision upon apparent authority.'
While it does not point out what conduct by the plaintiff amounted to a representation to the defendant, it seems that delivery of possession to a conditional
vendee is a representation, to persons who know that he is such, that he has
authority to subject the vehicle to liens valid against the vendor, because such
vendees customarily do have that authority in England
This case probably

'Pennington v. Reliance Motor Works, Ltd. [1923] i K. B. 127; Buxton
v. Baughan, 6 Car. & P. 674 (Eng. 1834); Granier v. De Marco, i7i N. Y.
Supp. 258 (1919).
2 Green

v. All Motors, Ltd. [19171 i K. B. 625.
'For discussions of, and extensive, although not complete citations of
authorities, both accord and contra, see Notes, 3o A. L. R. 1227 (924) ; 20
A. L. R. 249 (1922) ; L. R. A. ig5D II4I; 38 L. R. A. (N. s.) 97 (1912).
But see I WILLIsToN, SALES (2d ed. 1924) 753, n. 85. Pennsylvania is contra
to this English rule. Bankers Commercial, etc., Co. v. Brennan, 75 Pa. Super.
199 (1920) ; Stern v. Sica, 66 Pa. Super. 84 (1917).
For a very recent American case, which differs from the problem here discussed only in that the lien
was statutory, see Hartford Accident, etc., Co. v. Spofford, 138 Ati. 769 (Me.
1927) ; and Comment (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 527, which treats the problem from
a different aspect, that is, as though the conditional vendee were the owner.
'Whether the original transaction was a conditional sale, hire-purchase,
bailment with option to purchase, or chattel mortgage is immaterial to the
solution of the problem presented by the principal case, for in all these transactions substantially similar rights have been reserved by the original owner,
and the question is whether these rights can be subordinated to a repairman's
lien to which the motor vehicle has been subjected by the other party to the
transaction, not what are the differences among these various rights. Therefore, no distinction has been taken among them, either in treating the problem,
or in citing cases. All are simply called conditional sales. Also, statutory
liens are excluded from the scope of this comment, except where they are
merely declaratory of the common law.
5
Williams v. A~lsup, 1o C. B. (N. s.) 417 (Eng. 1861). While this case
obviously does not deal with motor vehicles, it deals with the same problem in
regard to a chattel mortgage of a ship, and it first enunciated this theory, and is
cited in the majority of the cases on this question as the leading case.
" But this is not entirely certain, for Scrutton, L. J., first states that this
vendee had implied authority to subject these cabs to liens valid against the
plaintiff, and then proceeds, "if a man is put in a position which holds him out
as having a certain authority, people who act on that holding out are not
affected by a secret limitation, of which they are ignorant, of the apparent
authority."
Green v. All Motors, Ltd., supra note 2.
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adds a third view to the two previously extant on this question. And it
would seem that it leaves no way open to a conditional vendor to escape such
liens. However, it is probable that this doctrine will be confined to conditional
sales of motor vehicles, since ordinarily a bailee does not have authority to
subject a bailed chattel to lien,' and therefore a delivery of a chattel to him
is not a representation that he has any such authority. Also, it seems doubtful
whether this doctrine will meet with any great degree of favor in the United
States, even in.those jurisdictions which followed the English rule previously.
In at least one of them, a garageman's lien for repairs was held invalid against
a conditional vendor, where the former knew that the person who ordered
the repairs was a conditional vendee.'

OFFIcERs-LIABILITY OF A DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR MALICIOUS PROSECUTIoN-The defendant, a state's attorney, received an anonymous letter charging the plaintiff with a felony. Shortly thereafter he received a forged letter
which purported to be a confession by the plaintiff. Without further investigation, the defendant swore out a warrant for the plaintiff's arrest. The
charges proved false, and the plaintiff brought an action for malicious prosecution. Held, (tvo judges dissenting) that the defendant has an absolute immunity, and is not liable. Kittler v. Ketsch, 216 N. W. 898 (N. D. 1927).
The liability of public officers to private actions for damages arising from
official acts is an unsettled field of law
The majority of courts favor immunity where the office is quasi judicial? A district attorney is generally
considered a quasi judicial officer? Some cases go farther than the principal
case, and exempt a district attorney from civil liability, even though he be
actuated by malice or other corrupt motives.4 These cases assert a public
8

Pennington v. Reliance Motor Works, Ltd., Buxton v. Baughan, both
sutpra note I; Walker v. Burt, 57 Ga. 20 (1876).
'Hollis v. Isbell, 124 Miss. 799, 87 So. 273, 2o A. L. R. 244 (1921). See
Dunbar-Laporte Motor Co. v. Desrocher, 247 Mass. 292, 295, i42 N. E. 57
(1924).
See Note (1925) U. OF PA. L. REv. 300. See Spalding v. Vilas, i6i U. S.
483 (1896) (immunity) and Yealy v. Fink, 43 Pa. 212 (1862) (liability).
See also 29 CYc 1444, and cases cited.
'BISHOP, NoN-CONTRAcT LAW (i889) §789; MECHEM, PUBLIC OFFICES
AND OFFICmES (I890) §640; Cyc. loc. supra note I.
'Commonwealth v. Nicely, 130 Pa. 261, 270, 18 Atl. 737, 738 (1889),
"The district attorney is a quasi judicial officer. He represents the commonwealth and the commonwealth demands no victims . . . it is as much the
duty of the district attorney to see that no innocent man suffers as it is to

see that no guilty man escapes."

WEEKS, ATTORNIES AND COUNSELLORS

AT

LAw (2d ed. 1892) § 282a.
'Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.(2d) 396 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926), commented on in
(1926) 6 BosT. U. L. REV. 280; (1926) 4o HARv. L. REV. 324; Griffith v.
Slinkard, 146 Ind. 17, 44 N. E. iooi (1896) ; Smith v. Parman, ioi Kan. 115,
I65 Pac. 663 (917); Copeland v. Donovan, i24 Misc. 553, 2o8 N. Y. Supp.
765 (1925); Watts v. Gerking, III Ore. 654, 228 Pac. 135 (I94), (where
the court reversed its first decision. III Ore. 641, 222 Pac. 318 [1924]), corn-
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policy which requires that he be absolutely unhampered in his duty of enforcing the law. The dissenting opinion did not deny an absolute immunity
for quasi judicial conduct, but expressed the view that where a district attorney acts maliciously, or without probable cause, he exceeds his authority, and
becomes liable as any private individual.5 The law bf the principal case may
occasion hardship, as in this plaintiff's case. But opposed is the interest of
the public in having the law vigorously enforced. The latter seems the more
important consideration. Furthermore, there remains a check on district
attorneys in public action, as by removal from office.

PLEADING-AMENDMENTS

AFTER THE STATUTORY PERIOD OF LImITATION-

N. & G. Taylor Co., a partnership, made a non-negotiable contract with the
defendants, upon which the latter defaulted. After such default, the partners
organized as a corporation the N. & G. Taylor Co., Inc., and took over the
assets of the partnership including its rights under the above-mentioned contract. The corporation brought suit, but failed to allege incorporation and
assignment 1 After the statutory period of limitation had expired the plaintiff
requested and was given leave to amend in that particular. Held, that the
amended declaration stated a new cause of action, which was barred by the
statute. Taylor Co., Inc. v. Anderson, 48 Sup. Ct. 144 (1928).
The law is well settled that an amendment will be considered as filed
when the original petition was filed,2 unless it states a new cause of action, in
which case the date of filing the amendment is taken.' The general principle
is clear, but in its actual application the courts are in hopeless conflict as to
what constitutes a new cause of action. Some courts take a very narrow
view and hold that changes amending the action from trespass to case,' or
from an express contract to an implied contract' represent substantial changes.
mented on in (925) 4 Oa. L. REv. 154. Contra: Leong Yau v. Carden, 23
Haw. 362 (i916); Schneider v. Shepherd, 192 Mich. 82, i58 N. W. 182
(1916) (false imprisonment). Cf. Carpenter v. Sibley, 153 Cal. 215, 94 Pac.
878 (ipo8) ; Arnold v. Hubble, 18 Ky. L. R. 947, 38 S. W. 1041 (1897) ; Parker
v. Huntingdon, 2 Gray 124 (Mass. 1854).
'Leong Yau v. Carden, Schneider v. Shepherd, both supra note 4.
'The Illinois Practise Act of i9o7, ILu. REv. STAT. (Cahill, 1927) c. 11o,
provides that the assignee of any non-negotiable chose in action may sue thereon
in his own name "and that he shall in his pleading on oath, or by his affidavit, where pleading is not required, allege that he is the actual bona fide owner
thereof,
and set forth how and when he acquired title."
2
Fidelity Trust Co. v. Dubois Electric Co., 253 U. S: 212 (I92O) ; Davis
v. New York, Lake Erie and Western R. R., no N. Y. 646, 17 N. E. 733
(1888).
'Union Pacific Ry. v. Wyler, 158 U. S. 285 (1894); Andrews v. Marsden,
278 Pa. 56, 122 Atl. 17 (923).

'Hess v. Birmingham Ry., 149 Ala. 499, 42 So. 595 (I9o6).
Nystel v. Gully, 257 S. W. 286 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923); Meinhausen v.
Gettelman, 113 Wis. 95, 113 N. W. 408 (19o7). Contra: Merchants' Collection Agency v. Gopcevic, 23 Cal. App. 216, 137 Pac. 6og (1913) ; Harwood
v. Carter, 47 Nev. 334, 222 Pac. 28o (1924).
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On the other hand, liberal courts hold that changing from an equity suit
to a common law action' or from an action under a state statute to one
under a federal statute' does not represent a change of substance. Many courts
have laid down mechanical tests for determining what constitutes a new cause
of action. Perhaps the most quoted rule is that laid down in an early federal
case," that if the same evidence does not support the amended declaration and
if it is not subject to the same defenses nor the same measure of damages, it is
a different cause of action. While the instant case is properly decided according
to such tests, it is submitted that such criteria do not insure sound and just decisions. Justice Holmes in a recent Supreme Court case' said that "when a defendant had notice from the beginning that the plaintiff sets up and is trying to
enforce a claim against him because of specified conduct, the reasons for the
statute of limitations do not exist, and a liberal rule should be applied." This
seems to be the only fair and sensible view to take of the subject. The decision
of the principal case was based on the Illinois statute as interpreted by the Illinois courts " and may be distinguished on that ground. Apart from that consideration, it seems out of accord with the recent liberal decisions of the same
court.'

'Friedrichsen v. Renard, 247 U. S. 2o7 (1918) ; noted in (1918) 27 YALE
L. J. 1053.
'N. Y. Cent. & Hudson River R. R. v. Kinney, 260 U. S. 340 (1922);
Lammers v. Chicago Great Western Ry., 187 Iowa 1277, 175 N. W. 311 (919).
'Whalen v. Gordon, 95 Fed. 305 (C. C. A. 8th, 1899).
'N. Y. Cent. & Hudson River R. R. v. Kinney, supra note 7.
0 Illinois is usually referred to as having the narrowest rule of any state.
and holds that a declaration which omits an essential allegation, may not, after
the statute has run be amended to insert the missing allegation, even though
no attempt is made to change the substantial nature of the cause of action.
Foster v. St. Luke's Hospital, 191 Ill. 94, 6o N. E. 8o3 (igoi). And with
regard to the very statute involved in this case, they have held that a cause
of action that is subsequently amended to insert the necessary allegations of
assignment, represents a new cause of action, which is barred if the amendment is filed after the statutory period has expired. Allis-Chalmers Mfg.
Co. v. Chicago, 297 IIl. 444, 13o N. E. 736 (i92i); Gallaghdr v. Schmidt, 313
Ill. 4o, 144 N. E. 319 (1924).
The Supreme Court held that the district court properly followed the
procedure required under the Illinois statute, 17 Stat. 197 (1872), U. S. C.
(Q925) Trr. XXVIII, § 724, and properly followed the Illinois decisions determining that a failure to plead as required by that statute, constituted any
amendment a new cause of action, i STAT. 92 (1789), U. S. C. (1925) TiT.
XXVIII, § 725. The opinion does say that in any event this constituted a new
cause of action, apart from the Illinois' decisions, but this dictum does not
seem to be within the spirit of other recent decisions of the Supreme Court,
infra note ii.
' N. Y. Central & Hudson River R. R. v. Kinney, supra note 7; Friedrichsen v. Renard, supra note 6; Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. v. Wulf, 226
U. S. 570 (1913); Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Renn, 241 U. S. 290 (1916).
See however Salyers v. United States, 257 Fed. 255 (C. C. A. 8th, ig1g).
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PRINCIPAL AND SUIETY-DISCHARGE OF SURE.rY BY RELEASE OF JUDGMENT

LIEN-The plaintiff bank discounted certain judgment notes of a company, on
which the defendant was surety. The company became financially involved and
the plaintiff entered judgment on the notes. Within four months thereafter
other creditors of the company prepared to file a petition in bankruptcy against
the company, which would have avoided the plaintiff's judgment liens. To save
as much as possible for all creditors, the plaintiff agreed to release its liens in
consideration of the other creditors agreeing to withdraw the bankruptcy proceedings, so that the property of the company might be sold by a receiver
without the cost of bankruptcy proceedings. The jury found that the company
would have been adjudged bankrupt and that the sale by the receiver saved
more for the creditors than the bankruptcy sale would have, and thus that the
defendant was not injured by the release of the plaintiff's judgment lien. Held,
that the defendant surety was not discharged by the release of the lien. First
National Bank of Irwin v. Foster, 139 Atl. 6o9 (Pa. 1927).
If a creditor has in his hands security for a debt, a surrender of this security to the debtor operates as a release of the surety in so far as it would
This rule is based on the fact that
have produced funds to satisfy the debt
such surrender injures the surety's right of subrogation, by impairing a right
of the creditor against the debtor to which the surety would be entitled to be
The creditor also has the duty of using ordisubrogated on paying the debt
nary business care in preserving the security, and if through his negligence the
security decreases in value, the surety is discharged to the extent of such de3
If the loss of the security is occasioned by no fault of the creditor,
crease.
the surety is not relieved,' and there is a tendency to hold that a voluntary surrender of all or a part of the value of the security in the exercise of a wise
business judgment does not operate as a discharge of the surety.' In any case
the surety is discharged only to the extent of the injury he suffers by the loss
of the security,' though where the security has been voluntarily relinquished
the burden of proving the absence of injury is on the creditor.' While the
principal case can be fully supported on the jury's finding that the plaintiff
creditor had affirmatively proved that the defendant surety suffered no iniurv
by the release of the lien, it is important that the court places it on the ground
1 Rogers v. Trustees of Schools, 46 Ill. 428 (1868) ; Hutchinson v. Woodwell, 107 Pa. 509 (1884); State v. Hartford Co., 14o Wash. 278, 248 Pac.

432 (1926).

' La Farge v. Hunter, ii Barb. 159 (N. Y. 185o); Johnson v. Jones, 39
Okla. 323, 135 Pac. 12 (1913); Neff's Appeal, 9 W. & S. 36 (Pa. 1845).
'Mulvihill v. Bank, 8o Colo. 72, 249 Pac. 504 (1926) ; Seymour v. Bank,
157 Ga. 99, 121 S. E. 578 (1923); Ramsay v. Westmoreland Bank, 2 Penr. &
W. 205 (Pa. 1830).
'Savings Bank v. Downing, 16 N. H. 187 (1844) ; Sternback v. Friedman,
23 Misc. 173, 5o N. Y. Supp. 1025 (1898).
'Kaufman v. Loomis, i1O Ill. 617 (1884) ; Neff's Appeal, supra note 2;
Security State Bank v. Dawson. 261 S. W. 821 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924).
'Taylor v. Continental Supply Co., 16 F.(2d) 578 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926);
Park Bank v. Kleman, 278 Pa. 165, 122 Atl. 221 (1923).
Cheshire v. Hightower, 33 Ga. App. 793, 127 S. E. 891 (1925); Guild v.
Butler, 127 Mass. 386 (1879).
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of the plaintiff having surrendered the lien in the exercise of a wise business
judgment. It would seem that such a rule finds support in principle, for it
allows a creditor to exercise a sound business discretion in dealing with securities, and thereby often enables him to increase their value to both himself
and the surety. Under the rule putting the absolute risk of their loss on the
creditor when he voluntarily deals with them, he will oftentimes be hindered
from acting where good judgment would dictate otherwise.
TAXATION-TAXATION AS INCOME TO LESSOR OF TAXES PAID BY LESsE-In accordance with the terms of the lease, the lessee paid the federal income

tax on the amount paid to the lessor as rent. The lessee paid under protest a
further tax levied upon the sum paid by him on behalf of the lessor, considered as income to the lessor, and sued to recover the latter tax. Held, that the
plaintiff recover, as the latter tax is invalid. Boston and Maine R. R. v. United
States, 23 F.(2d) 343 (D. C. Mass. 1927).
The Internal Revenue Acts' expressly provide that rent is taxable as income to the lessor. In the ordinary case where the lessor pays his own income
tax, he is taxed upon the amount later paid as income tax, as well as upon the
net gain from the rental, since income tax is not deductible. If this is in
reality double taxation, it was certainly intended by Congress,' and is open to
no valid objection.' And it would seem that the government should receive the
same amount of tax where the lessee pays the income tax on behalf of the
lessor.: The tax may still be income to the lessor, even though it was never received by him.' In the principal case the court held that the income tax paid
by the lessee on behalf of the lessor was not income to the lessor because it
brought no gain to him. But as the tax offsets a loss which the lessor would
suffer were he obliged to pay his own income tax, it may be regarded as income in the form of rent.' The fear expressed by the court that a decision
143 STAT. 267, 283 (924),
U. S. C. (1925) TIT. XXVI, §§954(a), 985.
See also 39 STAT. 757, 766 (1916) ; 40 STAT. 301 (1917) (under which principal

case was decided).

Northern R. R. v. Lowe,

250

Fed. 856 (C. C. A. 2d, 1i8).

U. S. C. (1925) TIT. XXVI, §§955, 986; 40
STAT. 330 (1917) ; HOLMES, FEDm.AL TAXES (6th ed. 1925) 944.
3
Cf. 39 STAT. 759 (ii6) with 40 STAT. 330 (1917).
"Patton v. Brady, 184 U. S. 6o8 (1902); 4 CooLay, TAXATION (4th ed.
1924) § 1756; Wickersham, Double Taxation (1926) 12 VA. L. REv. 185.
243

STAT. 270, 284 (924),

"Taxes paid by a tenant to or for a landlord for business property are additional rent and constitute . . . taxable income to the landlord . .
T. D. 3062, C. B. 3-1198 (1920). Appeal of Providence and Worcester R. R.,
5 B. T. A. 1186 (1927) (overruled by principal case). But see U. S. v. Nor-

wich and W. R. R., 16 F.(2) 944 (D. C. Mass. 1926).
'U. S. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., i F. (2d) 157 (S. D. N. Y.
1926) ; Houston Belt and Terminal Ry. v. U. S., 250 Fed. I (C. C. A. 5th,
1918) ; HOLMES, op. cit. supra note 2 at 238, 767.
"Income may be defined as the gain derived from capital, from labor,
or from both combined, provided it be understood to include profit gained
through a sale or conversion of capital assets." Merchants' Loan Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U. S. 509, 518 (1921).
'Holder v. Southern Cotton Oil Co., 34 Ga. App. 66, 128 S. E. 220 (1925).
But see Guild v. Sampson, 232 Mass. 5o9, 122 N. E. 712 (1919).
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that the tax paid by the lessee is income to the lessor would permit pyramiding of taxation seems unwarranted, since income tax is ordinarily levied on
the amount paid out as tax The case is open to the practical objection that
the lessor is permitted to evade part of his income tax by the simple device
of contracting that the lessee shall pay it and deduct it from the rent.
VENDOR

AND

PURCHAsER-INsuRABLE

TITLE-DUTY

OF VENDEE TO GIvE

REASONABLE NOTICE OF OBJBCTIONS TO VENDOR's TITLE-In a contract to sell

realty the vendor agreed to convey a "title good and insurable at regular rates
by any leading title company." Settlement was to be made six months from
date of agreement, and it was provided that time was to be of the essence of
the contract. Upon receipt of the abstracts the vendee promptly applied for
title insurance. Two days later the insurance company issued its settlement
certificates calling attention to several objections to be removed before it would
insure the title. All but one of these objections were suggested by the vendee
and noted by the title company without further investigation. The vendee
failed to give notice to the vendor of any of these objections until the evening
before the day fixed by the contract for settlement, when it was too late for
the vendor to take steps to remove them. Upon the settlement date the vendee
refused to perform because of the notations set out in the settlement certificate, and sues to recover the earnest money paid. At the trial an officer of
the title company testified that if the vendee had not misled it as to the true
facts, it would have been willing to insure the title. Held, that the plaintiff
vendee can not recover the earnest money. Groskini v. Knight, 290 Pa. 274,
138 At. 843 (1927).

Usually where the vendee stipulates for a title "insurable at regular rates"
the bona fide refusal of a title company to insure will entitle the vendee to
regain his "binder" money.' A fair interpretation of the intent of parties incontestably suggests this result, because the contract in effect provides that the
title must be satisfactory in the opinion of an unbiased third party. However,
to justify this conclusion, it is necessary to imply that the judgment of the
company be based upon a knowledge of the true facts. Where the title company has been misled as to the real situation, as in the principal case, this would
seem to remove the case from the general rule and make the question for the
jury whether the title company would have been willing to insure, had it been
cognizant of the facts.! In pursuance of this theory the lower court here sub"Tax is to be deducted at the source "where bonds, mortgages, . .
or other similar obligations of a corporation contain a contract or provision by
which the obligor agrees to pay any portion of the tax imposed . . . upon
the obligee . . ." 43 STAT. 277 (1924), U. S. C. (1925) TIT. XXVI, § 962.

This provision has been construed as making the tax paid by the obligor untaxable as income to the obligee. Duffy v. Pitney, 2 F. (2d) 230 (C. C. A. 3d,
1924).

The provision does not seem to cover a lease.

'Baker v. Kaplan, 282 Pa. 239, 127 Atl. 623 (1925); WARVELLE, ABSTRACTS (1921) § 318. See also Allen v. Pockwitz, 1O3 Cal. 85, 36 Pac. 1039
(1894) ; Friendly v. Elwert, 57 Ore. 599, 105 Pac. 404 (19o9) ; Perkinpine v.
Hogan, 47 Pa. Super. 22 (1911).
'Baker v. Kaplan, supra note I.

RECENT CASES
mitted the question to the jury who found the title in dispute was in fact insurable. Hence, as far as the title tendered was concerned the vendor was not
in default. Furthermore, the court took judicial notice of a local custom' of
Philadelphia by which the vendee is required to give reasonable' notice of his
objections to the vendor's title, and considered this custom as an implied condition of the contract between the parties. Breach of this implied condition
afforded the main ground for denial of recovery to the vendee. Courts of
other jurisdictions in somewhat similar situations have reached a like result
by holding that a failure to give notice of defects constituted a waiver of the
clause that time be of the essence? On principle it would also seem justifiable
to hold that the conduct of the vendee has prevented performance by the other
party. By the ordinary rule of contract law this should provide a valid excuse
to the vendor e Because of the greater difficulty of proving a local custom, it
would appear the other defenses suggested provide an easier, although no more
effective, method of defeating such an action brought to avoid performance of
the contract.
The majority rule is that if a local custom is to be relied upon as forming part of a contract, it must be pleaded. Staroske v. Pulitzer Publishing
Co., 235 Mo. 67, 138 S. W. 36 (19xi); Palmer v. Hamiston, 87 Ohio St. 401,
ioi N. E. 283 (913) ; Poland v. Hollander, 62 Misc. 523, II5 N. Y. Supp. io42
(igog). However, in the instant case, to establish his right of action, the
vendee relied upon a custom that settlement certificates are considered binding
between the parties and so gave defendant vendor the opportunity of availing
himself of the custom requiring notice as a defense.
" "The promptness required on the part of the vendee would be largely dependent upon the time fixed in the contract for closing the deal." St. Clair v.
Hellweg, 173 Mo. App. 66o, 159 S. W. 17 (1913).
'St. Clair v. Hellweg, supra note 4; I WARVELLE, VENDOR AND PURCHASER
(1890) 330. Also see Stevenson v. Polk, 71 Iowa 278, 292, 32 N. W. 340, 349
(1887).
Two cases seem to suggest that retention of the abstract for an
unreasonable time is a waiver of defects in the vendor's title. Durband v. Ney,
196 Iowa 574, 19I N. W. 385 (1923); Chandler v. Gault, 181 Wis. 5, 194 N. W.
33 (1923). An analogy perhaps can be drawn between this suggestion and a
situation where the vendee by specifying certain objections waived others not
pointed out. Smith v. McMahon, 197 Mass. 16, 83 N. E. 9 (1907); Schwartz
v. Woodruff, 132 Mich. 513, 93 N. W. io67 (19o3) ; Eagleton v. Higgins, 155
N. Y. 466, 5o N. E. 287 (1898). In Lessenich v. Sellers, 119 Iowa 314, 93 N.
W. 348 (1903), it was held that retention of the abstract for four days without
giving notice did not constitute a waiver of any objections to the title under the
circumstances of that case.
'Cottrell & Sons v. Smokeless Fuel Co., 148 Fed. 594 (C. C. A. 4th, 19o6);
Meyer v. Frenkil, ii6 Md. 411, 82 AtI. 208 (1911); Vandergrift v. Cowles
Engineering Co., i6I N. Y. 435, 55 N. E. 941 (igoo).

